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Abstract 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Industrial Democracy are two paradigmatic 
approaches to transnational labour governance. They differ considerably with regards to the 
role accorded to the representation of labour. CSR tends to view workers as passive recipients 
of corporate-led initiatives, with little attention paid to the role of unions. Industrial Democracy 
centres on labour involvement: Those affected by governance need to be part of it. Examining 
the Bangladesh Accord and Alliance as governance responses to the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, 
this article offers a comparative perspective of how Industrial Democracy-oriented and CSR-
oriented translate into differences in implementation. The paper highlights that while CSR can 
foster effective problem-solving in the short run, Industrial Democracy is necessary to build 
governance capacities involving workers in the long run.  
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When Industrial Democracy meets Corporate Social Responsibility – A Comparison of 
the Bangladesh Accord and Alliance as responses to the Rana Plaza disaster 
 
On 23 April 2013, large cracks appeared in the eight-storey Rana Plaza building in the Savar 
district of Dhaka, Bangladesh. A bank, shops and offices in the lower floors closed the next 
day. But several thousand garment workers, who lacked a strong collective voice, were 
prompted to enter the building despite safety concerns. The building collapsed, killing over 
1,100 workers, highlighting the absence of worker voice to refuse unsafe work. The name 
“Rana Plaza” has become synonymous with the problems of labour rights in global supply 
chains, but also with the failure of social auditing adopted by brands as part of their Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) commitments: two of the factories in the complex had been 
audited shortly before the disaster. While CSR provides a mechanism to step in where public 
regulation is absent, Rana Plaza also highlighted the problem of the lack of worker voice.  
 
CSR is typically seen as a corporation’s voluntary engagement with its stakeholders, including 
consumers and civil society actors to work towards the improvement of social and 
environmental standards. Yet, organised labour itself has been conspicuously absent from the 
definition, design and governance of CSR. This is surprising given that many CSR initiatives 
are aimed at the improvement of labour standards (Fransen and Burgoon, 2013; Locke, 2013). 
An alternative approach to the regulation of labour within global supply chains that puts 
workers at the centre of the design and implementation of initiatives to improve their conditions 
is grounded in Industrial Democracy.  These two approaches, as will be outlined below, are 
built upon different normative assumptions and this article seeks to understand empirically how 
differences in the design of such initiatives plays out.  
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This article compares the implementation of two competing governance initiatives to improve 
workplace safety in the Bangladesh ready-made garment sector post-Rana Plaza: The “Accord 
for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh” (Accord) and the “Alliance for Bangladesh Worker 
Safety” (Alliance). The Alliance is built upon a fairly traditional CSR-based approach, 
resulting in collective, transnational industry self-regulation. The Accord is broadly based on 
principles of Industrial Democracy, resulting in a form of transnational co-determination. 
However, unlike traditional Industrial Democracy, where collective bargaining rights are 
underpinned to a lesser or greater extent by the state, in the Bangladesh case, the consistent 
failure of the state to enforce effectively worker rights has meant that brands, rather than states 
have become the ultimate enforcer in employment relations. Being rooted in significantly 
different logics presents a unique opportunity to compare the interplay between the Industrial 
Democracy and CSR approaches to transnational labour governance. The article investigates 
these different logics underlying supply chain labour governance from a conceptual approach, 
followed by the research methods and key findings. Finally, insights are derived on how the 
interplay between Industrial Democracy and CSR shapes global labour governance. 
 
Transnational labour governance in global supply chains: two approaches 
The fragmentation of global supply chains and the outsourcing of production to countries where 
labour standards are weak and enforcement even weaker have severely challenged traditional 
labour governance mechanisms of collective bargaining and public regulation. In the absence 
of such mechanisms embedded within the national context where production is carried out, 
regimes of “private labour governance” (Hassel, 2008) and “global labour governance” have 
emerged (Meardi and Marginson, 2014). Yet, there has been significant contestation about how 
these regimes should function. Should they mirror traditional forms of labour governance based 
on democratic principles of trade unionism and/or state regulation or should they leverage the 
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market power and reach of private corporations? Unsurprisingly, trade unions seeking to 
protect workers globally have sought to develop mechanisms based on bringing domestic 
collective bargaining into the international realm (Marginson, 2016). But as O’Rourke (2003; 
2006) highlighted many governance responses are driven by corporations seeking to protect 
their brand image. Corporations emphasise voluntary, business-centred company decision 
making in the form of CSR. 
 
For this reason, many industrial relations academics have shown scepticism about initiatives 
that claim to be socially responsible, yet exclude democratic representation of workers and are 
not embedded within regimes of state regulation. This is reflected in “a degree of reluctance in 
both the HRM and IR communities to actively engage with CSR” (Preuss et al, 2009: 954), 
mirroring the reluctance of unionists to lend legitimacy to an approach that does not provide 
appropriate representation to labour actors (Preuss, Gold & Rees, 2015). To understand better 
this political contestation in the construction of global labour governance, this article next 
examines the different logics underpinning Industrial Democracy and CSR.  
 
Industrial Democracy. The notion of Industrial Democracy (Webb and Webb, 1898) underpins 
much of the industrial relations approach to transnational labour governance. Its core principle 
is the need for the democratic participation of worker representatives in the governance of 
labour conditions (Kaufman, 2000). Kaufman (2000) highlights four key components 
underscoring the Industrial Democracy approach: democratic methods for worker participation 
in decision making; those within the organisation can hold those in authority to account; due 
process to be followed in disputes; and a balance in power between the employer and workers 
through collective organisation. Thus, the involvement of unions representing the interests of 
workers in developing labour regulation is seen as crucial (Egels-Zanden, 2009). Global Union 
 
 
5 
 
Federations (GUFs), seen as the legitimate representatives of global labour, take a prominent 
role in the emerging global labour governance architecture (Fairbrother et al, 2013). GUFs have 
created International Framework Agreements as negotiated agreements with MNCs. While not 
panaceas, these provide a mechanism for creating transnational industrial relations and 
supporting collective bargaining across the global supply chain (Sobczak, 2007).  
 
CSR. CSR is broadly understood in terms of socially beneficial activities that go beyond a 
corporation’s legal obligations to stakeholders (Carroll, 1979). Jones (1980: 59) defines CSR 
as “the notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in society other than 
stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law and union contract.” In global supply chains, 
CSR activities typically take the form of voluntary, private social auditing initiatives, such as 
codes of conduct and other forms of industry self-regulation (Fransen and Burgoon, 2013). 
Corporate-driven CSR codes have the advantage that brands can impose them upon their 
suppliers using contractual relationships. But corporations, subject to activist campaigns and 
media exposés, often make CSR commitments to reduce reputational risk emanating from poor 
labour conditions (Khan et al., 2007; Wells, 2007). Given this instrumental orientation, CSR 
has often been criticised as a form of “greenwashing” or “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner 1999) 
where multinational corporations adopt a few, isolated social projects doing good to distract 
from a continuing self-interested, socially harmful approach to profit generation.  
 
As will be developed, CSR and Industrial Democracy differ in their approach to transnational 
labour governance. Table 1 summarises the two approaches and identifies four key dimensions 
of difference: (1) conception of the firm (2) different criteria for input and (3) output legitimacy 
and (4) credible commitments versus flexible voluntarism.  
<<<<<<<<<< Insert Table 1 >>>>>>>>>> 
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Conception of the firm. Unitarist versus pluralist frameworks in industrial relations differ in 
terms of whether managers and employees are seen as pursuing common or divergent 
objectives, interests and values. Industrial Democracy is built upon a pluralist conception of 
the firm: the firm is composed of a plurality of competing and divergent interests which are 
represented by different actors. Central to the pluralist approach is that the interests of workers 
and management are underpinned by “structured antagonism” (Edwards, 1986). As such, 
workers need to be free to choose their own democratic representatives to pursue their interests 
as managerially dominated agendas will inevitably be designed to further the interests of the 
firm. Thus, collective bargaining and other forms of worker participation are necessary to 
achieve trade-offs between management and worker interests. For instance, the notion of 
“worker co-determination,” often narrowly applied to the German works-council model, is 
broader in origin and to use Muller-Jentsch’s terms (2003:40) “the dominant theme of co-
determination was labour’s claim to a legitimate role in the running of companies and the 
economy”. 
 
In contrast, CSR often operates on the basis of unitarist assumptions of aligned interests. CSR 
is employed as a strategy to sustain competitive advantage (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Smith, 2003). As Margolis and Walsh (2003) observe, the mainstream CSR debate centres on 
the financial contribution of CSR activities to profit maximization and shareholder value as the 
overarching objective. At best, CSR initiatives generate “win-win” opportunities where there 
is a business case for doing good (eg. Mintzberg, 1983). Critics argue that CSR-type concepts 
such as “shared value” ignore the complex tensions between different stakeholder interests 
(Crane et al, 2014). CSR is viewed as inherently exaggerating corporate concern for the 
common good (Whelan, 2012) and, rather than democratic embeddedness, is driven by the 
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corporate concern to “look good” and protect their brand in the face of “naming and shaming” 
by activist groups (O'Rourke, 2006; Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007; Fransen and Burgoon, 
2013).  
 
Input legitimacy. Given global labour governance regimes have no recourse to an overarching, 
democratically mandated authority, legitimacy is a crucial and contested dimension of 
transnational governance. Governance legitimacy has often been discussed in terms of 
Scharpf’s (1997, 1999) distinction between input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy. The 
democratic ideal of input legitimacy means that “political choices should be derived, directly 
or indirectly, from the authentic preferences of citizens” (Scharpf, 1997: 19). Industrial 
Democracy is based upon the belief that workers are the citizens of the corporation, and 
democratic processes require their representation and participation primarily through 
independent worker representatives (Webb and Webb, 1898; Kaufman, 2000). Their 
participation in the design, structures, and processes is regarded as an important activity in 
itself (Royle, 2005; Sobczak, 2007). Thus unions, elected representatives of labour interests, 
are necessary participants in what we call “transnational co-determination”.  
 
CSR also requires input legitimacy, and multi-stakeholder forms of CSR are generally seen as 
having greater input legitimacy than unilateral codes of conduct (Fransen, 2012; Mena and 
Palazzo, 2012). But critics have pointed out that CSR-type stakeholder representation often 
relies on what Koenig-Archibaldi and Macdonald (2013: 517) call “solidaristic proxies”, such 
as NGOs and activist groups, rather than being controlled by workers themselves as the 
beneficiaries. Fransen (2012: 188) describes this as a situation of “business-driven programmes 
are trying to have their cake and eat it too: they want the external support that engagement with 
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various stakeholder groups offers, without actually allowing these groups a central place in 
governance.” 
 
Output legitimacy. Output legitimacy refers to “the capacity to solve problems requiring 
collective solutions” (Scharpf, 1999: 11). For proponents of Industrial Democracy, output 
legitimacy is interwoven with input legitimacy, suggesting that effective solutions can only be 
developed through the input of workers and preferably agreement of workers (Rees et al, 2015).  
Rather than monitoring outcomes (Niforou, 2015), the focus is on process rights, particularly 
Freedom of Association including the right to form a union, to strike and to collective 
bargaining with the aim of enabling workers to defend their own interests. The CSR approach 
is outcome driven and tends to emphasise instrumental and pragmatic activities to solve 
governance problems, where protecting brands can take priority (O'Rourke, 2006). It is based 
on economic-instrumental rationality where the effectiveness of governance as a problem-
solving mechanism is the key element of legitimate governance. Managerial experts or outside 
contractors, rather than workers themselves, may be best placed to design and implement 
solutions. But the absence of labour representation means that CSR programmes are more 
likely to favour effective solutions to perceived supply chain reputational risks, such as wage, 
hour, health & safety violations over worker rights that have the potential to weaken managerial 
control over supply chain operations (Anner, 2012).  
 
Credible commitments vs flexible voluntarism. A final point of comparison relates to how 
much “teeth” approaches have. The Industrial Democracy approach stresses parties making 
credible commitments through agreement in contrast to flexible voluntarism in the CSR 
approach. Developing credible commitments where parties are expected to deliver their side of 
an agreement is key to industrial relations scholars (Williams et al, 2015). As such, institutions 
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develop which are mutually reinforcing in terms of holding parties to the commitments which 
they make: it is through these institutions that penalties for breaches of commitments and 
incentives for adhering to commitments are enacted (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
In contrast, a recurring assumption in the CSR debate is its conception as discretionary and 
voluntary rather than a societal obligation. As Matten and Moon (2008: 405) observe, 
responsibilities “lie at the discretion of the corporation”, rather than on sanctions that can be 
authoritatively applied (e.g. Carrol, 1999). Brammer, Jackson and Matten (2012: 3) note this 
contradiction underlying CSR between “a liberal notion of voluntary engagement and a 
contrary implication of socially binding responsibilities”. Rather than defined by law or 
through committing agreements negotiated with trade unions, voluntary CSR regulation 
involves a “market” for standards (Reinecke, Manning and Von Hagen, 2012) where 
corporations can shop around to select those standards that are best suited to business interests. 
Locke (2013) highlights that this leads to lack of enforcement of CSR-driven social auditing in 
that brands do not always withdraw orders when non-compliance arise, thus not providing 
credible sanctions necessary to commit suppliers to comply with standards. 
 
Interplay between Industrial Democracy and CSR in global supply chains 
While it is still debated whether CSR is a step forward or backward in the fight for labour rights 
in the global economy (Anner, 2012; Wells, 2007, 2009), an emerging literature is exploring 
complementarities between union activities and CSR in global supply chains (Bartley and 
Egels-Zanden, 2015; Donaghey et al, 2014; Preuss et al, 2015; Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015). 
Industrial relations scholars have begun to recognise that the fragmentation of production 
challenges the ability of trade unions to govern labour standards (Marginson, 2016). First, 
effective collective bargaining requires embeddedness in a framework of supporting 
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institutions (Howell, 2005), which is often lacking in many developing economies. This often 
leads to brands taking on the role of enforcement traditionally carried out by the state. As such, 
a blurring of the distinction between Industrial Democracy and CSR takes place. Secondly, 
“chicken or egg” scenarios arise where strong unions are needed for a collective bargaining 
approach to emerge but strong unions often do not emerge until they have meaningful 
collective bargaining rights (Niforou, 2015). 
 
Unions have increasingly engaged in complementary activities that induce companies to take 
responsibility (Compa, 2004, Egels-Zanden, 2009). This has prompted a growing relationship 
between unions and NGOs in terms of building international alliances to leverage CSR 
commitments of brands and retailers (Preuss et al, 2015; Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015). In a 
study of Indonesian apparel unions, Bartley and Egels-Zanden (2015) found that leverage 
points include whistleblowing in cases of major grievances, “naming & shaming” campaigns 
and local capacity-building. However, gains were modest, fragile and overall limited by the 
risks of leveraging CSR, rendering CSR a weak and unreliable platform. Other scholars have 
argued that CSR holds promise to contribute to promoting labour standards as transnational 
corporations assume quasi-governmental governance duties and fill regulatory voids left by the 
retreating state. Matten and Crane (2005; Williams, Abbott and Heery, 2015) observed forms 
of “civil regulation” where corporations co-design forms of oversight of global employment 
relationships. This line of scholarship has somewhat “mutated” the CSR concept in arguing for 
a more political conception of CSR in global supply chains where corporations take on the 
traditional functions of the state as supporting institutional frameworks (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011). Yet, even in this broader, more political conception of CSR, rather scant attention has 
been paid to the role of democratic participation of workers. Scholars have mainly focused on 
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the role of NGOs and activists (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007), while organised labour has 
generally been seen as excluded from the definition and practice of CSR (Royle, 2005).  
 
In sum, CSR offers opportunities for promoting labour rights due to the global reach of 
transnational corporations especially in contexts of ineffective industrial relations and weak 
government institutions. But the absence of democratic labour participation is problematic 
because corporate-driven CSR systems lack accountability towards its purported beneficiaries. 
This begs the question whether CSR can be infused with principles of Industrial Democracy to 
become more democratic? If yes, how would such an approach differ from a normal CSR-
driven approach in terms of the design and implementation? The governance responses to the 
2013 Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, the Accord and the Alliance, were chosen as a 
revealing case to understand how differing global labour governance logics shape their design 
and implementation. The Accord is designed according to principles of Industrial Democracy 
but with corporations taking on a political CSR role, creating an interplay of Industrial 
Democracy and CSR. The Alliance is driven by corporations taking on a political CSR role 
alone. Thus, the research question driving the paper is to examine how differences in the logic 
of global labour governance translate into differences in design and implementation on the 
ground.  
 
Research context: The Bangladesh Ready Made Garment Sector 
After China, Bangladesh is the second largest garment producing economy, with over 5,000 
factories employing approximately four million, mainly women, workers. Since the garment 
sector emerged in 1976, it has dwarfed all others with $21.5bn (approximately 80% of total) in 
annual exports and 13% of GDP, according to 2012/13 figures. Despite Rana Plaza, the sector 
grew to $26.5bn in 2015 with the ambition to reach $50bn by 2021. Anner (2015) describes 
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Bangladesh as “despotic market labor control” where workers lack market power alongside 
ineffective state protection. Since Rana Plaza, the government has publicly criticised efforts to 
increase regulation and unionisation in the ready-made garment sector. A hostile context for 
trade unionism, low density, lack of unity with 34 union federations in the garment sector alone 
(ILO, 2015), an immature system of industrial relations and political corruption point to the 
limitations of traditional labour governance in the sector. Following a change in the labour law 
post-Rana Plaza, the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2015) reported a rise in factory-
level union registrations to 437 by March 2015 out of at least 4,500 officially registered 
garment factories. Yet, according to the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, only 200 are still active 
with many fewer functioning properly due to both employer resistance and lack of organising 
capacities and, with international pressure subsiding, the government rejected 73% of 
applications for new union registrations in 2015.  
 
Weak labour power and hyper-competitiveness have not only depressed wages but investment 
in factory safety. As a result, the sector has been bedevilled by a series of fatal industrial 
accidents, including the 2012 Tazreen disaster which killed 112 workers and the Rana Plaza 
disaster of 23rd April 2013, often despite factories having been certified by reference to CSR 
auditing standards. Shortly before the collapse, two factories in the Rana Plaza complex, 
Phantom Apparels and New Wave Style, were audited against the Business Social Compliance 
Initiative’s standard. While legally, brands had no legal duty of care, pressure grew on them to 
take responsibility for the health and safety of garment workers after Rana Plaza. Two parallel 
initiatives emerged in response: The Accord in May 2013 followed by the Alliance in July 
20131. On the surface, they appear to be comparable, having as their central rationale worker 
                                                          
1 Assessments of factories not covered by the Accord and Alliance are carried out by engineering teams led 
by Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and overseen by the Tripartite 
Committee in Bangladesh with the assistance of the ILO. 
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safety in the Bangladesh ready-made garment sector. Yet, on closer examination, the initiatives 
represent paradigmatic cases of transnational co-determination (Accord) and industry self-
regulation (Alliance), differing considerably with regards to the role of labour representatives 
and critical governance dimensions, as outlined in Table 2.  
 <<<<<<<<< Insert Table 2 >>>>>>>>>> 
 
Methods  
Sixty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted between October 2013 and late 2015. 
The first phase involved 29 interviews in buyer countries, including staff from unions, 
campaigning groups, brands, the ILO, the Accord and Alliance and other relevant actors, such 
as the Ethical Trading Initiative. The second phase involved three fieldwork trips in Bangladesh 
of two weeks each in 2014 and 2015. This included on-site visits to four supplier factories to 
Accord and Alliance brands (two each) and interviewing a further 40 respondents based in 
Bangladesh offices of the ILO, Accord, Alliance, embassies, brands, factory owners, unions 
and local NGOs. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 3 hours. All but two interviews 
were fully recorded and transcribed verbatim. Publicly available documents related to the Rana 
Plaza disaster, the Accord and the Alliance were also collected. 
 
To analyse the data, the governance structures of the Accord and Alliance were examined with 
their (co-)development over time mapped in terms of the involvement of different governance 
actors in their implementation. Since both initiatives eventually agreed on a common set of 
inspections standards, focus was placed on the areas of difference, as well as the interaction 
between the two initiatives. We then zoomed in on two concrete implementation policies: 
worker compensation and workers voice. Worker compensation for loss of income while 
factories were undergoing repairs was theoretically significant because it raised the question as 
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to where responsibility for employment issues (i.e. with the brand or the Bangladeshi employer) 
is located in the supply chain, as well as the degree to which workers are themselves involved 
in pursuing their interests. Workers’ voice was theoretically significant because voice brings 
to the fore the issue of divergent interests between management and workers. 
 
GOVERNANCE DESIGN  
The governance design of the Accord and Alliance reflects the different commitment of each 
initiative to principles of Industrial Democracy and CSR as outlined above: pluralist versus 
unitarist interest representation, credible commitments versus flexible voluntarism and 
orientation towards in- and output legitimacy. 
 
Pluralism versus unitarism in governance structure 
Labour-Driven governance in the Accord. The Accord presents a pluralist structure in which 
labour is recognised at the highest decision-making level and acts an example of transnational 
co-determination. GUFs were heavily involved in the design of the first governance response 
to Rana Plaza: The Accord. IndustriALL and UniGlobal, representing garment workers in 
Bangladesh and retail workers in developed countries respectively, were to the forefront of 
negotiations with brands to push them to sign up to an agreement which labour actors had 
previously drafted but which had lacked sufficient commitments from brands to become live 
(Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015)2. This led to a negotiated, collective agreement between two 
GUFs, eight Bangladeshi unions (all IndustriAll affiliates) and over 200 buyer companies 
(“brands”) from Europe, North America and Asia, with four labour rights NGOs as witness 
                                                          
2 The Worker Rights Consortium and the Clean Clothes Campaign in collaboration with Bangladeshi 
unions attempted to establish a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ in 2012 for brands to invest in building 
safety in Bangladesh and Pakistan, yet it failed to gather the necessary support of at least four companies. 
Nevertheless, the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ became the precursor to the Accord. For more information, 
see Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015. 
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signatories. Interviewees highlighted that the clear demarcation between the brands and unions 
as signatories, with the NGOs being “witness signatories” marked the Accord as being a 
collective agreement, distinct from CSR. Part of the rationale for GUFs to champion the Accord 
was the argument that traditional CSR initiatives failed due to not involving labour actors. As 
an experiment in transnational co-determination, the Accord presented an opportunity to 
integrate principles of Industrial Democracy to develop more robust mechanisms of worker 
representation.  
 
The labour caucus insisted on the Accord being not just a voluntary commitment but a legally 
binding agreement, previously unseen in transnational supply chain labour governance.  Brand 
signatories are legally bound to contribute financially on a sliding scale up to US $0.5 million; 
members agree to maintain their purchasing volumes from Bangladesh for two years; and 
disputes go to binding arbitration which can be enforced through the legal system in the home 
country of signatory brands. The fact that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) took on 
the role of independent chair of the Accord Steering Committee is indicative of the pluralist 
governance structure. Having both labour and business interests at the table, the Accord more 
closely resembled the ILO’s tripartite governance structure than a CSR initiative, even if 
international brands rather than local employers of Bangladeshi workers represented business 
interests at the table. The Accord thereby sought to leverage the power of the brands, via 
enforceable commitments, while minimizing the degree to which the process is vulnerable to 
obstructionism by local employers, who were excluded from the agreement. By leveraging 
brand power to constrain local employer behaviour, the Accord created space for unions to play 
a meaningful role on safety issues, space that did not previously exist.  
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The Accord’s governance structure creates a balance between the interests of labour and 
corporations. This created accountability and inevitably also rendered governance processes 
more conflictual. Ultimately, unions can hold companies accountable to the Accord’s terms 
through binding arbitration, which rendered them powerful partners. As members of the 
Accord Steering Committee, unions raised controversial issues, such as brand responsibility 
for financing costly compensation and remediation. Unions were also the actors who handled 
complaints filed by Bangladeshi workers and raised them through the Accord which may 
otherwise not have been addressed.  
 
Corporate-Driven governance in the Alliance. Led by Gap and Wal-Mart – a determinedly 
anti-union employer – some US-based brands, who were criticised for not signing the Accord, 
due to its legally binding nature, launched a parallel initiative two months after the Accord on 
July 10, 2013: The Alliance. Consistent with its CSR underpinning, the Alliance is essentially 
a voluntary sector approach by 29 brands, all bar one coming from North America. 
Respondents described the Alliance as a “me too” initiative which tried to make itself look like 
the Accord by adopting similar features: It is a collective approach by brands; shares broad 
commitments to workers’ safety, training and voice; includes specialised auditing for structural, 
electrical and fire safety; and publishes auditors’ reports online.  
 
While on the surface the Accord and Alliance appear similar, the Alliance does not include 
unions as signatories. The Alliance involves local unions only in an advisory capacity through 
the Board Labor Committee: Workers have no formal voice in decision-making. Its board of 
directors is dominated by business interests: It includes four brand representatives, three 
outside experts, and an independent chair, and, until July 2015, the President of the Bangladesh 
Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) as representative of local 
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business interests. Described as learning from the “shortcomings of the Accord”, which faced 
strong criticism in Bangladesh for excluding local employers, the Alliance was instrumental in 
engaging with factory owners and the BGMEA. This explicit inclusion of local business actors 
rendered the Alliance more legitimate in the eyes of Bangladeshi employers and policy makers. 
Nevertheless, the BGMEA President resigned his seat on the board in July 2015 over 
differences with the Alliance, leaving neither body having the BGMEA on its governing body. 
 
Credible commitments versus flexible voluntarism: Binding versus voluntary agreement 
A key difference is the legally binding nature of the Accord in contrast to the more traditional, 
unenforceable CSR approach by the Alliance. The rationale for requiring Accord signatory 
companies to maintain purchasing volumes from Bangladesh for two years was that employers 
could invest in developing workplace safety while having a steady stream of orders to fulfil. 
Thus the Accord was designed to develop stability while employers made the structural 
adjustments necessary to fulfil the principles of the Accord. Commitment to a legally binding 
agreement and funding a five-year programme was described as assurance that brands would 
not “cut and run” out of Bangladesh but were prepared to take responsibility.  
 
In contrast, the Alliance is strongly aligned to Carrol’s (1999) notion that CSR as “soft” 
regulation is a voluntary commitment by corporations that is typically motivated by the 
business case. Voluntarism and the primacy of business interests are stressed in the deeds of 
the Alliance:  
 
“The Corporation [Alliance] is a voluntary association of business organizations the 
primary purpose of which…is to further their common business interests by 
strengthening worker safety conditions at ready-made garment (“RMG”) factories 
within the business organizations’ supply chains in Bangladesh.”  
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While the Alliance also emphasises that it is legally binding, this is limited to fee payments. 
Brands pay relative to their purchasing volumes up to US $1 million per year for an initial 
minimum of two years followed by a one-year notice period. Unlike the Accord, there is no 
commitment to maintain purchasing volumes or to legally binding arbitration. Where included, 
stakeholders are used in an advisory capacity rather than through a negotiated co-management 
approach. As such, worker safety is seen as an issue between the business interests in the supply 
chain, rather than an issue for both workers and business to solve. Thus, the Alliance resembles 
the legal construction of voluntary codes of conduct whose intended beneficiaries are 
companies rather than workers. This point about voluntary codes was clarified in 2007 when 
the International Labor Rights Forum brought a suit in California against Wal-Mart on behalf 
of workers for code prohibitions on overtime and non-payment of overtime wages (ILRF, 
2015). Wal-Mart admitted to the courts that its code of conduct was intended to protect it from 
reputational harm, which meant that workers had no standing to sue.    
 
Input and output legitimacy: Interacting to level up 
The Accord and Alliance were not simply competing initiatives, but their co-existence created 
strong legitimacy pressures to perform under the global spotlight, especially since comparisons 
were drawn (Labowitz & Pauly, 2014). Thus, the co-existence of the Accord and Alliance led 
to a “levelling up” effect. To begin with, input legitimacy was scrutinised from different sides. 
In the US, student-led actions and protests were initiated against the Alliance and its member 
brands for having no worker representatives, while in Bangladesh criticism was levelled against 
the Accord for excluding employers. To placate local employers, the Accord introduced formal 
meetings twice a year between the Accord steering committee and the BGMEA but without 
offering a seat on the steering committee. 
 
 
 
19 
 
Yet, overall, the Accord had established a high bar in terms of worker representation, brand 
commitments, inspection quality and transparency commitments. To be able to defend their 
program as credible, Alliance brands had no choice but to embrace some of the elements of the 
Accord (though not all of them), including commitments that no brand had previously made. 
For instance, by establishing a “Board Labor Committee” the Alliance created quasi-
representation for workers that they had previously excluded. However, this was criticised as 
a “token” board with only advisory function. Unions are not part of the Alliance Board of 
Directors and thus have no institutional power to hold corporate signatories like Wal-Mart, 
Target or Gap to account. Both IndustriALL and the International Trade Union Confederation 
made it clear they expected their affiliates to decline invitations to participate. This led to the 
ironic situation that a Wal-Mart-led initiative drew legitimacy from the participation of unions 
affiliated with the Marxist-Leninist “World Federation of Trade Unions”.  
 
Nevertheless, the creation of the Alliance Board Labor Committee created a slightly more 
pluralist approach that led to important changes: Nine months into its life, and following 
requests from the Board Labor Committee, an amendment to the bylaws introduced a clause to 
prevent reprisal against workers, which had hitherto been missing. However, while the Accord 
clause merely requires a worker to believe the building is unsafe to benefit from its protection 
from “undue consequences”, the Alliance requires “an imminent and serious danger to his/her 
life”. In addition, under the Accord, a factory found to be taking retaliatory action against 
workers for raising safety concerns becomes ineligible to supply for all Accord signatory 
brands, while the Alliance declares the supplier as being in breach of the byelaw but leaves the 
decision about whether to continue business at the discretion of individual brands.  
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In addition to pressures regarding input legitimacy, pragmatic and operational considerations 
placed pressures in terms of output legitimacy on both initiatives to harmonise their approaches. 
As Accord and Alliance brands often sourced from common factories, consistency necessitated 
common structural, fire and electrical standards. Harmonisation was achieved through an 
“intense and ongoing period of coordination and collaboration” in which the ILO (2015: 9) 
played “a central role in facilitating stakeholder cooperation in what have at times been 
complex negotiations”. Both initiatives agreed a common set of standards based on the 
Bangladesh National Building Code and a common reporting template to ensure consistency 
between inspection reports produced by the different initiatives, as well as mutual recognition 
of audits in factories that were shared between Accord and Alliance brands. Remediation plans 
followed the inspections and follow up inspections are carried out at factories. Where these are 
not carried out to a sufficient level, both agreements can declare non-compliant and ineligible 
to supply signatory companies. By September 2016, the Accord had severed relations with 41 
factories with the Alliance suspending relations with 97 and escalating action against a further 
138 factories.  In sum, the high bar set by the Accord created a strong motivation for the 
Alliance to engage in leveling up. Thus, governance competition with a high-level initiative 
led to a stronger programme than would have been the case had the Alliance existed alone. But 
also the Accord faced comparison with the Alliance and thus was motivated to showcase the 
rigour of its approach. Yet, as outlined below, the implementation of the two initiatives also 
revealed the significance of the differences in their underlying logics.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION: CAPACITY BUILDING VERSUS PROBLEM-SOLVING  
The Accord and Alliance differ in terms of the extent to which they aim to empower workers 
to solve problems on their own behalf, with important implications for their legacy as both 
initiatives are due to end in 2018. This was summed up by one interviewee who stated that “the 
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real difference between the Accord and the Alliance is…that the Accord is trying to build 
something for after 2018 [when it expires], while the Alliance is just trying to solve a problem 
in the short-term.” The Accord emphasises capacity-building because it is underpinned by an 
approach that workers need to be enabled to act on their own behalf and make safety self-
sustaining rather than business taking care of their interests. Putting democratic worker voice 
at the core of safety processes, it has taken a proactive role in including workers in safety 
management and protecting them from retaliation.  
 
Building Worker Voice under unfavourable conditions 
Both the Accord and Alliance aim to establish Organisational Safety and Health (OSH) 
committees with elected worker representatives, in line with Bangladesh Labour Law and in 
recognition of the need to create an internal, workplace-based mechanism to address safety 
concerns. However, given that in most factories worker representatives are selected rather than 
elected, this has proven to be a highly significant obstacle. Both initiatives established safety 
committee pilot programmes with the aim of rolling them out more broadly. In late 2015, the 
Accord started with approximately 70 unionised factories. While this picked the low hanging 
fruit as these factories did not require the organisation of elections, the fact that these OSH 
committees were overseen by the Accord meant that worker representatives enjoyed additional 
protection from retaliation over safety-related issues. Realising this, unions leveraged OSH 
committees as a protection mechanism for the union officers they placed on the committees. 
By framing the Rana Plaza disaster as an issue of worker disempowerment and lack of voice 
rather than just poor infrastructure, the Accord attempted to harness international pressure on 
Bangladesh to accept the need for effective industrial relations against resistance from local 
industry. 
 
 
 
22 
 
While both the Accord and the Alliance grant unionised workers – or representatives in non-
unionised workplaces – the right to be present during inspections in principle, the Accord 
offered active intervention, which was necessary as implementation proved challenging in 
practice. Worker participation is unparalleled. In the prevailing social auditing model, workers 
are excluded from inspections and reports are proprietary to corporate clients. Participation of 
worker representatives required the Accord to work closely with unions to overcome resistance 
from factory managers, as well as the willingness to address violence and threats to union 
members. The Accord employed field workers who trained and worked proactively with union 
leaders of all fourteen IndustriAll affiliates in Bangladesh to inform them about their rights 
under the Accord to participate in inspections and obtain copies of inspection reports, made 
available in the local language. In cases where management refused to let unions participate in 
inspections, informed workers were able to get Accord case handlers to intervene and ensure 
their participation.  
 
While inspections with the input of genuine labour voice occurred in relatively few factories, 
where it occurred, it was a powerful mechanism to strengthen worker voice by legitimising 
their representation. In the societal context of factory hierarchies where workers enjoy very 
little respect, interviewees highlighted the symbolic importance of workers seeing union 
leaders actively participating in factory inspections. For a local union president “to be seen 
walking through the factory with those inspectors” was considered a powerful demonstration 
that workers were eligible to speak on the same level with outside authorities and managers. In 
sum, the Accord realised it had to invest in longer-term capacity-building to support and defend 
workers facing threats, violence and intimidation to enable and sustain their genuine 
participation beyond one-off external interventions. 
 
 
 
23 
 
Worker compensation and factory closures 
The way the Accord and Alliance dealt with the issue of worker compensation for loss of 
earnings in cases of (unsafe) factory closures reveals key differences in their approaches: 
brand-benevolence versus labour-negotiation. While closures following the initial inspections 
only affected a small proportion of workers, it was heavily politicised. Out of 1454 Accord and 
662 Alliance inspections, 34 Accord and 26 Alliance factories went to the Review Panel,  
established under the Bangladeshi National Action Plan, to decide on factory closures. These 
were factories that potentially posed immediate threats to life. This led to 16 closures under the 
Accord and 8 under the Alliance, of which 4 were shared. Bangladeshi law (Labor Act, 2006, 
Art. 20) requires that when workers’ employment is terminated due to retrenchment (akin to 
redundancy), the affected employees must be paid compensation in the amount of 30-days 
wages for each year of service. Yet, in practice, it was often difficult for workers to pursue their 
rights. Thus, both the Accord and Alliance put in place different compensation mechanisms to 
deal with the employment implications of factory closures.  
 
Alliance – A brand-benevolence approach. The Alliance pursued a “brand-benevolence” 
approach that relied not on workers to pursue their interests but on brands to act benevolently 
on the behalf of workers. The Alliance requires both employers and brands to pay two months’ 
compensation each. The contribution by brands is paid directly from the Alliance member-
funded Worker Safety Fund, which reserves 10% of its resources for the support of temporarily 
displaced workers. This provided a quick response mechanism to make interim payments of up 
to two months’ salary paid directly by the Alliance. However, once this payment was made, 
the remaining two months’ severance was an issue to be dealt with by the employer. The extent 
to which this was paid was unclear as workers often moved onto other jobs quickly and legal 
enforcement in Bangladesh is limited.    
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Accord – A labour-negotiation approach. Under the Accord, workers are entitled to six 
months’ compensation if the factory is temporarily shut and four months, in line with 
Bangladeshi law, if the factory is permanently shut. Out of eight factories which shut (with 18 
re-opening after remediation and eight factory relocations), workers received full benefits in 
one and 2-3 months’ compensation (i.e. short of the legal requirement) in three cases. In four 
cases, compensation is yet to be finalised. Where a need for compensation arose, the Accord 
pursued a negotiation approach that was premised on the principle that compensation should 
be negotiated between employers and workers, that workers should be enabled to pursue their 
own interest, and that employers, rather than brands, should be made to take responsibility. 
Both brands and unions agreed that it was important to create a strong expectation of employer 
responsibility within the Bangladesh context and end a culture in which factory owners could 
“cut and run” with the profits while abandoning their legal responsibilities towards workers. 
 
In the few cases where workers were only paid a lump sum severance, the Accord heavily 
relied on workers to raise the issue and put pressure on employers and brands. While some 
brands were responsive, overall the minutes of the Accord Steering Committee meetings 
recorded general criticism of brands not making adequate efforts. “This was the most 
frustrating part…They were really slow to step in and put pressure on the suppliers,” as one 
labour rights activist recalled. GUFs took an active role in supporting negotiations across the 
supply chain. IndustriAll employed one staff member in Europe and two in Bangladesh to 
facilitate conversations among workers, unions and brands. If needed, they would put pressure 
on the brands presently sourcing from closed factories by documenting non-compliance with 
the Accord, which could result in legal arbitration. Working in collaboration with IndustriAll 
and other international partners such as the Workers’ Rights Consortium, provided local unions 
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with an important opportunity to build capacity in pursuing negotiation skills, which were often 
absent due to a confrontational tradition of union-management relations. Moreover, once 
compensation payments were achieved, it allowed local unions to showcase their capacity to 
pursue workers’ interest.   
 
However, in the context of low-paid, female migrant workers with low literacy from rural areas, 
the Accord’s negotiation approach was perceived as a cumbersome, “very slow process.” 
Delays in compensation payments were seen as inadequate help to low paid workers who 
needed the money immediately to sustain their livelihoods. At time of writing, and more than 
a year after closure, unions are still negotiating compensation in the case of the closure of one 
factory. The case is complicated by the fact that it involves multiple buyers and a “yellow” 
union (that was not a signatory to the Accord) who agreed a compensation deal that undercut 
both the legal and Accord minima. Negotiating in permanently closed factories is difficult as 
neither unions nor brands have much leverage. Yet, the Accord provides a platform for 
negotiations to take place whereas without the Accord, the pathway for workers to receive any 
payment would be shut off on closure.  
 
Trade unionists interviewed, including some Accord signatories, expressed greater satisfaction 
with the Alliance on the speed of compensation, which workers often received in part within 
days and could seek alternative employment. Even though the Accord requires an extra two 
months’ payment, in taking a principled position that the employers pay compensation, it was 
much more difficult to enforce. However, while the Alliance provides a straightforward 
solution in the short-term, it does little to develop longer term associational capacity and 
negotiation skills for union federations to address other employment-related issues. In sum, the 
Alliance’s focus on problem solving for, not by, workers proved more effective in terms of 
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compensation speed, leading to more immediate income payments for workers in need. In 
contrast, the Accord relied on the active role of labour actors in demanding compensation, thus 
trying to develop capacity, even if this was seen as slow and insufficient to serve workers’ 
immediate needs. 
 
Dealing with complaints - Utilization of workers’ voice 
Both the Alliance and the Accord emphasised the need for workers to be able to voice critical 
safety concerns. Yet, they pursued different mechanisms; an individualised versus a collective 
mechanism of voice. The focus on worker voice grew out of the recognition that Rana Plaza 
could have been prevented if workers had had a voice to refuse unsafe work. But given low 
union density – with a union registered in only 21 out of 598 Alliance and 65 out of 1,500 
Accord factories at the time of the disaster– facilitating worker voice was a challenging task 
 
Alliance Helpline ‘Amader Kotha’ - Utilization of individual voice 
The Alliance set up a toll-free worker helpline to provide workers with an independent 
reporting channel to raise safety concerns anonymously. The local Bangla name ‘Amader 
Kotha’ (= “Our Voice”) implies a collective approach. But the helpline is designed as an 
individualised channel helping the Alliance to trouble-shoot problems where they occur. The 
Alliance (2015) marketed this mechanism as a “new, innovative approach to workplace 
problem solving” that aligned with the interests of factory managers as it “can be used to boost 
worker morale”, consistent with a more unitarist approach. ‘Amader Kotha’ provides a “bridge 
between management and workers”, as the hotline manager described it. Once implemented, 
each of the estimated 537,214 Alliance factory worker will be required to wear the ‘Amader 
Kotha’ helpline card in his/her badge. By November 2016, the hotline was implemented in 806 
factories, covering almost all Alliance and some non-Alliance factories. Given the lack of 
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collective representation and functioning worker-management dialogue, the helpline was easily 
accessible to workers with low levels of education. Cooperation with the NGO ‘Phulki’, which 
had a long-term presence in factories as a childcare provider, was an attempt to gain workers’ 
trust. When a complaint is received, issues are passed onto factory managers and where serious 
safety concerns are raised, and Alliance technical experts become directly involved.  
 
Statistical diagnostics provides a tool for the Alliance to analyse caller trends. Since its 
inception in July 2014 until October 2016, 98,580 calls were made. 21% of reported issues 
categorised as “safety” issues, while 79% were “non-safety” issues. Urgent safety issues 
included factory fires, locked exits, cracks in beams, columns and walls, shaking walls or 
windows and sparking or short circuits. This indicates that the hotline serves a useful 
mechanism to report life threatening issues such as locked fire exits, the cause of 112 deaths in 
Tazreen in November 2012. However, the crude classification system of worker concerns into 
what counts as “safety” or “urgent safety” raises questions over how workers, who are routinely 
silenced and punished for raising concerns by factory management, can voice complex 
grievances that may not be easily classifiable. The fact that 67% calls are made from outside 
of the workplace indicates that the helpline is used as a one-way communication channel for 
individual voice that workers find easier to access away from the workplace, rather than a 
mechanism to raise grievance collectively in the workplace where they occur. With 67% of 
helpline users being men, the helpline also suffers from the underrepresentation of women, 
potentially perpetuating the existing silencing of women voices in the workplace. In sum, the 
Alliance Worker Helpline illustrates a problem-solving mechanism that offers speed and scope 
in implementation but relies on brand-sponsored external intermediaries rather than utilising 
or developing workers’ own capacities to solve such problems.  
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Accord complaints mechanism – Utilization of collective voice 
The Accord sought to develop a mechanism of collective voice alongside the capacity for 
individual complaints. The Accord developed a complaints mechanism through which workers, 
unions or brands may collectively bring a complaint against a factory for unsafe workplaces or 
worker victimisation. After hearing the facts, the Accord takes on an arbitrator role, produces 
a “Resolution” which decides the Accord position on the case. The Accord received 67 
complaints up to October 2016, 24 of which were filed by unions (see 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/safety-complaints/).   
 
The strengths and the weaknesses of this approach have been demonstrated in two cases. The 
first time the Accord complaints mechanism was truly tested on a freedom of association issue 
involved the “Dress and Dismatic” factory in Rampura, Dhaka. Management was resistant to 
allowing worker representatives to accompany a factory inspection in 2014. This escalated six 
months later when union members, using the Accord inspection report, reported weight 
overload to the Accord. This prompted an unannounced visit by the Accord. When the factory 
management retaliated against nine workers by forcing their resignation, they complained to 
the Accord. Despite it being a rather long, drawn out process, the workers decided to keep 
fighting with support of their union. After six months of investigation under the official 
complaints procedure, the Accord drew up a resolution ordering the reinstatement and back-
payment of wages for the nine workers, and made clear that the factory had to comply if they 
wanted to supply Accord brands. In December 2015, this was implemented by management.  
 
The second case involves “BEO Apparel,” a supplier to the German discounter Lidl, which 
employed approximately 1000 workers in Gazipur, a suburb of Dhaka. The factory-level union 
complained to the Workers’ Rights Consortium about a number of workplace issues in 
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September 2014. One was related to a boiler explosion, making it an Accord-related issue of 
worker safety. When the Accord got involved, BEO management first retaliated against the 
unionised workers who complained, claiming it was over performance issues, and later sacked 
48 workers who had participated in an Accord-convened meeting. Acting on the complaint 
filed on the grounds that BEO fired workers in retaliation for raising safety issues, the Accord 
subsequently issued a resolution against the factory and ordered reinstatement of the workers. 
Despite numerous meetings and negotiations between management, owners, unions, and the 
Accord with the involvement of the Workers’ Rights Consortium and UNI Global, the factory 
management refused to reinstate the workers. The conflict erupted in violence on 16 February 
2015 when Accord negotiators and staff from Lidl importers Distra and Chicca witnessed the 
beating with sticks and iron bars of the union general secretary and employees, and were 
themselves only able to leave factory premises after summoning the police. Fifteen days later, 
the factory owner decided to close the factory, as well as another factory as Accord brands 
were required to refuse to source from a factory under the same ownership. Workers were paid 
the legal severance payment and back payment to the union members who were sacked. At 
time of writing, Article 49 of the Accord, which requires brands to facilitate workers getting 
alternative employment where factories close, is being used in an attempt to find the workers 
jobs.  
 
In both cases, workers went for over six months without pay but eventually received it, even if 
factory closure was a highly unsatisfactory outcome in one case. However, such cases set 
important precedents in terms of the Accord enforcing standards including freedom of 
association. Both cases contributed to capacity building as the unions had to develop skills to 
make claims supported by evidence, negotiate with employers, and leverage brand 
relationships to exert pressure.   
 
 
30 
 
 
In comparison, the Alliance’s approach was primarily one of identifying individual voice first. 
This approach viewed safety as being an issue for the Alliance and factory management to 
solve rather than being an ongoing capacity issue for workers to negotiate. External support 
can provide effective and immediate intervention but lacks a longer-term mechanism for when 
funding is withdrawn. In contrast, the Accord focused on developing collective worker capacity 
to create a self-sustaining mechanism. However, the complaints mechanism was a long process 
and difficult for non-unionised workers to access. In addition, developing collective processes 
requires a favourable institutional framework supported by legal enforcement and the 
willingness of management to support, both of which are lacking in the Bangladesh context.  
 
Discussion 
While there are tensions between the Industrial Democracy and CSR approaches to 
transnational labour governance, the findings of this article highlights that the two approaches 
are not mutually exclusive: The Accord, as a form of transnational co-determination, is rooted 
in the organising principles of Industrial Democracy but with elements of CSR as well. The 
Alliance, as a form of industry self-regulation, is rooted in the principles of CSR. These 
differences are summarised in Table 3 following the dimensions outlined at the beginning of 
the article. 
<<<<<<<<<< Insert Table 3 >>>>>>>>>> 
 
The Accord demonstrates a strongly pluralist orientation with inclusion of worker 
representatives in its core governance structure, while the Alliance demonstrates a more 
unitarist approach but with the addition being made of worker representatives in an advisory 
capacity. This shift in the Alliance towards some, if limited, representation of labour illustrates 
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the pressures for input legitimacy it faced especially following its comparison to the Accord. 
In terms of input legitimacy, the Accord contains significant institutional actors in transnational 
employment relations. However, it must be noted that in terms of both density and coverage in 
Bangladesh, the unions are far from being encompassing groups in the Olsonian sense. In 
addition, the exclusion of the actual employers diverges somewhat from the Industrial 
Democracy ideal. In terms of output legitimacy, a key feature of the work of the Accord has 
been to develop a context where workers become agents for their own interests, which is 
aligned with the underpinning logic of Industrial Democracy. Without doubt, this is one of the 
most difficult tasks the Accord has set itself as there is little existing institutional support nor 
political appetite for worker agency in Bangladesh. The CSR approach of the Alliance has 
favoured external intervention, with for example, an external contractor providing its helpline 
and then intervening rather than assisting workers in bringing and processing threats 
collectively. Similarly, in the area of worker compensation for factory closures, providing 
quick and efficient recourse for workers comes at the expense of developing worker agency. 
In terms of credible commitment versus flexible voluntarism, the Accord’s legally binding 
nature in three areas meant that brands were legally accountable in terms of ensuring that 
contracts with non-compliant factories were suspended or terminated. This level of 
enforceability is a major departure from voluntary social auditing, where credible sanctions are 
rarely applied. The Alliance followed this approach and, while legally binding in a narrower 
sense, the co-existence of the Accord has helped to ensure that inspection standards remain 
high. These factors combine to lead to a number of key lessons that can be drawn from 
Industrial Democracy and CSR logics in developing labour rights in global supply chains.  
 
Lessons from engagement with CSR  
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Engagement with CSR can provide leverage points for unions and labour rights NGOs to 
develop improvements in labour conditions in the context of a lack of national institutions. The 
case of the Accord and Alliance shows how global governance initiatives can leverage the 
power and transnational reach of consumer-facing brands, the former via enforceable 
commitments, to put pressure on local employers. Thus, market-based pressures on 
corporations’ brand image rather than a real threat of disrupting production at the workplace is 
where the Accord and Alliance find their real leverage. In its mobilisation of this CSR 
mechanism, the Accord hence differs from traditional collective bargaining under Industrial 
Democracy in terms of both design and implementation. In terms of design, the Accord is based 
upon an agreement with brands at the buyer end of the supply chain rather than the employers 
who are party to the employment relationship. In terms of implementation, the Accord is seen 
as breaking new ground in using private enforcement capacity in absence of meaningful 
governmental regulation3. Making sourcing contracts with international brands contingent on 
compliance with the Accord and/or Alliance increases the extent to which Bangladeshi 
employers can be held to account. In sum, by engaging with brands rather than employers, the 
unions are utilising tools of the CSR approach to gain leverage to support workers. This 
leverage undoubtedly was enabled by the unique circumstances of the Rana Plaza disaster. 
However, the model of utilising pressure on brands proved an invaluable tool from which 
global unions can learn.   
 
                                                          
3 Strictly speaking, the Accord and Alliance are not exclusively private initiatives, but build on and 
intersect with the enforcement institutions of the state. In both initiatives, the ultimate legal authority to 
close factories lies with the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE) Inspector General. 
Recommendations for closure of factory buildings are assessed by the MoLE Review Panel, established in 
May 2014. Both the Accord and Alliance build on existing law and policy making in Bangladesh, such as 
the National Action Plan on Fire Safety and the National Building Code. Yet implementation of these laws 
is often lacking. In the Accord, firm compliance is embedded in international commercial arbitration 
mechanisms so that state courts would ultimately rule over businesses if they do not abide by factory safety 
standards of the Accord.  
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While CSR alone does not bring about meaningful institutional change (Bartley and Egels-
Zanden, 2015), a key advantage of the CSR approach is that it can bring about immediate 
problem solving when there is a lack of an institutional framework in global supply chain 
contexts, demonstrating the need of external intervention through market power. By using 
brands’ financial resources, the Alliance was able to make short-term effective interventions 
by paying compensation directly out of a central fund. In doing so, while workers may not have 
received as much as they would have been entitled to under the Accord, the speed at which 
payments were made, enabled workers to move into new jobs more quickly and with less 
financial precarity.  
 
The strengths and limitations of CSR is also illustrated in the related case of providing 
compensation for Rana Plaza survivors and the dependents of the dead. Primark offered 
immediate short-term aid to all survivors and developed a compensation programme for those 
who were employed by Primark supplier New Wave Bottoms (Primark, 2016). This ad-hoc 
CSR response was exemplary and unparalleled. But of course it could not ensure that all 
workers would receive accident compensation in the future. In contrast, the ILO’s approach of 
developing a collective Rana Plaza Compensation Arrangement is illustrative of the Industrial 
Democracy approach (ILO, 2015). Negotiated with representatives from the government, the 
local garment industry, brands, trade unions and NGOs, this took comparatively longer to be 
put in place. Yet, it aimed at creating a lasting legacy in terms of building local governance 
capacity and laying the foundation for a National Employment Injury Insurance scheme. Even 
if effective for problem solving in the short term, reliance on brands cannot be a long-term 
solution, as it makes workers’ rights contingent on continuing external support, thus 
highlighting the need for capacity building going forward.  
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Lessons from engagement with Industrial Democracy 
The Industrial Democracy approach offers lessons in terms of the need to build a participatory 
mechanism for labour involvement to empower labour actors to pursue their own interests in 
the long term, thereby building self-sustaining mechanisms of worker voice. The Accord places 
significant stress on building capacity to enable workers to develop meaningful collective 
representation in the area of health and safety as a preventative mechanism, but also in the area 
of workers’ rights more generally such as compensation and complaints. Capacity building 
requires a longer time horizon with discussions taking place what will come on the expiration 
of the Accord and Alliance in 2018.  
 
However, capacity building for worker representation is contingent on embeddedness within 
functioning institutional frameworks, both at the national and international level. The absence 
of collective worker representation capacities and weak legal support test the ability to develop 
meaningful collective, representation mechanisms. Unions are then more dependent on 
collaboration with other governance actors. By bringing together actors from along the global 
supply chain, the Accord demonstrated an effort to build effective processes of “transnationally 
co-ordinated global labour solidarity” (Wells, 2009: 577). 
 
Finally, while much of the mainstream CSR literature tends to downplay tensions between 
corporate interests and those of other stakeholders, including workers, transnational co-
determination based on Industrial Democracy affords a more open acknowledgement and 
accommodation of diverging interests. CSR-based self-regulatory initiatives often seek to 
“look like” more socially controlled initiatives and are thus “remarkably similar in their 
organizational design, processes and rhetoric” despite lacking pluralist control (Dingwerth & 
Pattberg, 2009; 708; Fransen, 2012). But the risk is that diverging voices are marginalised and 
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resulting policy instruments deviate significantly from those preferred by beneficiaries (Khan 
et al., 2007; Koenig-Archibaldi and Macdonald, 2013). This underlines the importance of 
transnational co-determination where recognised labour representatives participate in both the 
design and implementation of global labour governance.  
 
Interacting to levelling up 
Finally, while scholars have debated whether co-existing governance initiatives lead to a race 
to the bottom (Reinecke et al, 2012), this paper suggests that it may also create a process of 
“levelling up.” The labour-driven Accord established a high bar in terms of brand commitments, 
inspection quality and transparency against which any follower initiative would be measured. 
This placed the Alliance under greater scrutiny to perform and deliver on its promise. Thus, a 
levelling up effect is likely to be contingent on the existence of, first, a robust initiative where 
labour is included as a party, and second, strong legitimacy pressures. When negotiating the 
Accord, the labour caucus placed a high emphasis on developing credible commitments 
through a legally enforceable mechanism rather than voluntary CSR mechanism, which created 
greater constraints on business interests. Thus, even if business-dominated initiatives remove 
elements seen as counter to business interests, such as litigation risks in the Alliance, the 
existence of a more stringent alternative places them under greater scrutiny to perform. 
 
Crucially, levelling up worked because of dynamics of legitimacy: the initiatives were 
subjected to scrutiny at both ends of the supply chain. Under public scrutiny and pressures for 
legitimacy, co-existence of competing initiatives may lead to common “meta-standards” 
(Reinecke et al, 2012), such as, in our cases common inspection standards, mutual recognition 
of inspections of shared factories and public reporting. Scrutiny is likely to depend on the 
watchdog roles of unions and labour rights groups, such as the Workers’ Rights Consortium, 
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criticizing the Alliance over worker participation and repeatedly calling for Alliance brands to 
sign the Accord. As a corollary, the Accord faced more scrutiny and political pressure in 
Bangladesh in terms of the need to engage with local actors.  
 
Conclusions 
This article highlights that the underpinning logic of transnational governance initiatives has a 
significant role in shaping their design and implementation, resulting in transnational co-
determination with an emphasis on capacity building versus industry self-regulation with an 
emphasis on (business) problem solving. Did the co-existence of two competing initiatives 
mean that they mutually undermined each other, or positively influenced each other? From a 
pragmatic point of view, both initiatives are positive interventions to ensure safety. The co-
existence of competing initiatives meant that both had to demonstrate that each was as effective 
as the other, and that levelling up took place. The best indication of the effectiveness of the 
Accord and Alliance is that, to date, there has been no other major industrial accident in 
Bangladeshi garment factories since Rana Plaza, despite serious safety issues being identified 
in almost all factories. Compared to the rate of accidents prior to Rana Plaza, this meant that 
many lives were saved. Moreover, both initiatives have proved that collective oversight over 
inspections can overcome some of the limitations of previous auditing approaches, such as lack 
of specialised expertise and lack of effective sanctioning. However, while the capacity building 
supported by the Accord in particular will have a lasting impact beyond 2018, governance 
efforts need to go beyond the five-year time horizon to continue to address institutional 
constraints and strengthen worker voice.  
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Table 1: Industrial Democracy versus Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
 Industrial Democracy Corporate Social Responsibility 
Conception of 
the firm 
Pluralist  
• Recognition of the capital-
labour divide 
• Competing interests and 
political struggle 
• Governance agreements as 
negotiated balance of worker 
and corporation interest 
Unitarist  
• Assumes shared interests 
• Possibility of win-win / shared value  
• CSR should be instrumental to profit 
maximization and shareholder value 
Input 
legitimacy  
Participative representation  
• Democratic representation of 
workers 
• Worker participation in 
democratic process of decision-
making  
Corporate control limited by legitimation 
pressures to include societal stakeholders  
• Brands retain control, yet adoption of 
multi-stakeholder governance 
structures to gain legitimacy 
Output 
legitimacy 
Focus on process rights for workers 
• Freedom of Association 
Focus on measurable outcomes 
• Hours, wages, health & safety 
• Effective solutions  
• Consumer oriented 
Accountability Credible commitments 
• Aim is to negotiate binding 
agreements 
• Corporate accountability 
Flexible voluntarism 
• Voluntary participation beyond legal 
obligations  
• Corporate reputation and image 
• A “market” for CSR programmes 
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Table 2: Comparison of Accord and Alliance (as of October 2016) 
 
 Accord Alliance 
Governance 
model 
Transnational co-determination Industry self-regulation 
Coverage 1646 factories 770 factories (50% shared with 
Accord) 
Unsafe factories 
reported to 
review panel 
34 26 
Duration 5 years (2013 – 2018) 5 years (2013 – 2018) 
Legal 
commitments by 
signatory brands 
5 years’ participation 
Membership fees  
Maintaining purchasing volumes 
Binding arbitration process in legal 
system of home country 
Minimum 2 years’ participation 
Membership fees 
Constituency 
Brands >200 International brands from 20 
countries. 
28 North-American retailers 
representing 90% of RMG exports 
to the United States from 
Bangladesh plus one Australian 
retailer. 
Organised 
Labour 
IndustriALL, UNIGlobal, 6 
Bangladeshi unions (IndustriALL 
Bangladesh Council, BIGUF, 
BGWIF, …) 
None on Board. Five members of 
Labor Committee  
Other Four international labour rights 
NGOs are “witness signatories.” 
(Clean Clothes Campaign, 
Workers Rights Consortium, 
International Labor Rights Forum, 
Maquila Solidarity Network 
“Supporting associations”: North 
American trade associations and the 
NGO BRAC. Li & Fung serves in an 
advisory capacity. 
Governance 
Steering 
Committee  
3 Brands + 3 Unions, chaired by 
ILO  
4 Brands + Bangladesh industry 
member + experts + elected chair 
Advisory Board of Advisors with 
Bangladesh industry associations 
BGMEA/BKMEA 
Board of Advisors with 12 multi-
stakeholder industry experts  
Labour Committee of the Board 
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Table 3: Accord and Alliance in Comparison 
 Accord Alliance 
Conception of firm Pluralist, resulting in trans-
national co-determination 
Predominantly unitarist, resulting in 
industry self-regulation. 
Input legitimacy Inclusion of union representatives 
but low density and coverage.  
Exclusion of actual employers  
Business driven representation but 
introduced some labour 
representation to establish 
credibility 
Output legitimacy Focus on developing solutions 
through inclusion of worker 
representatives. 
Focus on institution building 
though from very low baseline 
External intervention driving 
provision of solutions. 
Focus on developing rapid solutions 
Credible commitment 
or flexible voluntarism 
Legally binding agreement. 
 
Voluntary except fee payment. 
 
 
